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C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 001000

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
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JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR HAYES
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2018

TAGS: [KACT](#) [PARM](#) [START](#) [JCIC](#) [INF](#) [US](#) [RS](#) [UP](#) [BO](#) [KZ](#)

SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIII: (U) U.S. CLOSING PLENARY STATEMENT,
NOVEMBER 21, 2008

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
Reasons: 1.5(b) and (d).

¶1. (U) This is JCIC-XXXIII-025.

¶2. (U) At Paragraph 3 below is the text of the U.S.
Statement that was delivered at the Closing Plenary Meeting
of the Thirty-third Session of the START Treaty's Joint
Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), held at the U.S.
Mission on November 21, 2008.

¶3. (S) Begin text:

STATEMENT
BY THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO
THE JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION
AT THE CLOSING PLENARY MEETING
OF THE THIRTY-THIRD SESSION

November 21, 2008

The U.S. Delegation joins with the Representatives of
the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the
Russian Federation, and Ukraine in closing the Thirty-third
session of the START Treaty's Joint Compliance and Inspection
Commission.

I

The progress we continue to make toward resolving
issues on the Commission's agenda is indicative of our
Governments' commitment and ability to work together
constructively during the intersessional period, in concert
with the business-like manner in which we approach these
issues here in Geneva. The United States appreciates the
work of our colleagues in this regard. Some issues, however,
will require sustained - and perhaps renewed - effort to
resolve.

II

The United States continues to be extremely concerned regarding the use of very large covers on missile front sections during SS-27 silo and road-mobile ICBM reentry vehicle on-site inspections (RVOSIs). The use of these large covers prohibits our inspectors from ascertaining that the front section contains no more reentry vehicles than the one warhead attributed to these missiles. We urge the Russian Federation to work to resolve this issue as soon as possible.

III

The U.S. remains concerned with respect to the Russian intention to declare the RS-24 prototype ICBM as a new type. The U.S. reiterates its request that the Russian Federation provide a clear explanation of the START Treaty basis for declaring the RS-24 as a new type based on the existing type of missile, the SS-25, rather than the SS-27, which is a declared variant of the SS-25.

IV

With respect to the stated Russian concerns regarding Minuteman III RVOSIs, the Delegations had a useful exchange of views on notional procedures and technical aspects of a possible one-time demonstration of the lower portion of a Minuteman III missile front section. The United States will study the feasibility of conducting such a demonstration and will communicate a proposal to the other Parties.

V

The Parties again discussed Russian concerns with the Courtland Missile Assembly Facility, including those elaborated in the Russian Aide-memoire of October 20, 2008. The United States emphasizes that the Trident I SLBM first stage motors are brought to Courtland to undergo activities that are consistent with work done at production facilities, including stage assembly. The technical information required by Joint Statements 21 and 31 for ICBMs or SLBMs used to deliver objects into the upper atmosphere or space, will be provided to the other Parties at the appropriate time. The U.S. emphasizes that, in accordance with paragraph 3(a) of Article III, any Trident I SLBM first-stage remains accountable as a Trident I SLBM and, therefore, would be subject to all the relevant provisions of the START Treaty as a Trident I SLBM.

VI

Russian concerns with the conversion of the B-1 heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs to a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments were again discussed at this session. The United States believes that the fundamental cause for the differences of views on this issue is that there is not a common understanding regarding the meaning of the phrase "incapable of carrying nuclear armaments." Accordingly, the United States has proposed a draft JCIC Joint Statement that if agreed would record the Parties' common understanding of that phrase. We were encouraged by the discussions of this issue by our experts, and urge the Parties to continue to study the U.S. proposed text and to communicate their views in diplomatic channels during the intersessional period.

VII

The United States appreciated hearing the views of the other START Treaty Parties as we begin to consider the extension of the Treaty in accordance with Article XVII. Our meeting on November 17 fulfilled the requirements of the Treaty to meet to consider this issue prior to December 5, 2008. The United States, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine will continue discussion of this issue, noting that a decision on this issue can be made up until the date of expiration of the Treaty on December 5, 2009.

VIII

With respect to the closing of the Votkinsk Portal Monitoring Facility, the Parties held extremely productive discussions regarding the U.S.-proposed draft documents relating to the closing of that facility. The United States notes that there are many logistical issues that must be resolved and that those details must be worked together with the other Parties. We are encouraged by the positive discussions we have had on the draft documents and look forward to receiving substantive comments on these texts through diplomatic channels as soon as possible.

IX

The United States notes the concerns expressed by the Russian Federation relating to the U.S.-declared conversion of 50 Peacekeeper silo launchers to Minuteman III silo launchers. The United States will study the Russian concerns and will respond as appropriate.

The United States notes the explanation provided by Ukraine regarding its proposal that the Parties consider the possibility of concluding a JCIC Agreement that would re-establish, as of December 2009, the types of former ICBMs listed in Article III, paragraph 10(c), and will study the Ukrainian proposal.

X

The United States notes the concerns expressed by the Russian Delegation with respect to a number of heavy bombers located at the Davis-Monthan Conversion or Elimination Facility. The United States would like to inform the other Parties that there are a number of heavy bombers undergoing aging and surveillance activities at the Davis-Monthan Conversion or Elimination Facility. As a result of these activities, these heavy bombers are in various stages of disassembly. These heavy bombers remain accountable under the Treaty and are subject to inspection, as provided for in the Tenth Agreed Statement. The United States assures the other Parties that if a decision is made to eliminate these heavy bombers in the future their elimination shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, including all required notifications.

The United States has attached this unilateral statement as an unclassified Annex to this plenary statement.

XI

We once again encourage our Treaty partners to communicate through diplomatic channels their views on agenda items, as well as any related information in support of those views, well in advance of our next JCIC session.

XII

Thank you all for your work here in Geneva. I look forward to continuing to work together during the intersessional period.

Once again, I'd like to thank our translators and interpreters for their exceptional work. Without them, we could not function.

Have a safe journey home.

End text.

¶4. (U) Taylor sends.
TICHENOR

NNNN

End Cable Text